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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES FLETCHER ANDERSON and 
JODE W. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 870066-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth 
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, finding Appellant-Andersons guilty of violation 
of Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 prohibiting 
the presence of an individual under the age of 21 in an 
establishment licensed to distribute draft beer. This 
appeal is taken as of right under Rule 3(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. • 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Are Sections 19-3-8 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City and 19-3-9 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
constitutional pursuant to the United States Constitution, 
and/or the Constitution of the State of Utah? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XII Section 2 
The transportation or importation into any state, 
territory, or possession of the United States for delivery 
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Section 32A-1-5. Definitions. As used in this title: 
(21) "Minor" means any person under the age of 21 
years. 
Section 32A-10-7. 
Cities and towns within their corporate limits, and 
counties outside of incorporated cities and towns have the 
power to license, tax, regulate, or prohibit the sale of 
light beer, at retail, in bottles, or draft. Licenses shall 
not be granted to sell beer in the proximity of any church 
or school, the local authority granting a license has the 
authority to determine in each case what constitutes 
proximity. 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
Sec. 19-3-8. Presence of minors in class "C" and class 
"D" premises prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall 
constitute an offense of strict liability for any person 
under the age of twenty-one years to: (a) Enter or be in or 
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about any premises licensed as a class "C", or class "D" 
establishment, for the sale of beer, or (b) To drink beer or 
any other alcoholic beverages in said licensed premises, 
(c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall 
be deemed guilty of an infraction and may not be imprisoned, 
but shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed $299. 
Sec. 19-3-9. Unlawful to permit minors in certain 
establishments. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute 
an offense of strict liability for any licensee of a class 
"CM, or class "D", license for the sale of beer or any 
operator, agent, or employee of such licensee to permit any 
person under the age of twenty-one years to remain in or 
about such licensed premises. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Municipal ordinances are entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality. The burden is upon the appellants-
Andersons to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the invalidity 
of the ordinance. Salt Lake City v. Savage. Neither at 
the trial, nor in the stipulated evidence was any evidence 
presented showing the ordinance reflected unequally upon the 
appellants-Andersons, nor was there any showing of 
unreasonable classification and application of laws to Class 
"C" licensed taverns. 
1
 541 P.2d 1035 (1975) . 
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Amendment Twenty-one of the U.S. Constitution clearly 
gives states the right to ban or regulate alcoholic 
beverages. The Twenty-first Amendment must be read in 
conjunction with the other amendments. This requires the 
courts to uphold the alcohol related laws if they bear a 
reasonable relationship to legitimate state interests. This 
is true even if the ordinance impacts upon rights normally 
protected by the first ten Amendments. The Twenty-first 
Amendment gives an added presumption of validity of State 
regulation in dealing with alcoholic beverages. 
Federal law as well as State law recognize the 
legislature's right to develop different classes and 
regulate according to classes. Both the State and the City 
classify licenses for the sale of alcoholic beverages into 
several classifications. Each classification has its own 
privileges and prohibitions. There has been no showing by 
appellant-Andersons that the classification scheme adopted 
by the City is arbitrary. The State statutes cited by 
appellant-Anderson-Anderson acknowledge the City's power to 
regulate in the area of alcoholic beverages. Due process 
and equal protection of the law are met if all members of 
the class are treated equally even though treatment may vary 
from class to class. 
The reasonableness of the classification is shown by 
the fact Class "C" taverns serve alcohol for consumption on 
the premises for profit. As such they are different from 
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restaurants whose primary business is food items; or private 
clubs that are required to be nonprofit and which are 
regulated by an agency of the State, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE ENTITLED TO A PRE-
SUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY 
AND EVERY REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION WILL BE 
USED (ESPECIALLY IN THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOL 
PURSUANT TO THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION) TO RENDER AN ORDINANCE AND 
ITS CLASSIFICATIONS VALID. THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF IS ON THE CHALLENGER TO PROVE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THE INVALIDITY OF AN 
ORDINANCE. 
As the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated: 
"In reviewing an ordinance or a statute to 
ascertain its constitutionality, certain 
rules of construction must be applied: 
M(a) A legislative enactment is presumed to 
be valid and in conformity with the 
Constitution. 
"(b) It should not be held to be invalid 
unless it is shown beyond a reasonabable 
doubt to be incompatible with some particular 
constitutional provision. (Emphasis added). 
"(c) The burden of showing invalidity of an 
ordinance or statute is upon the one who 
makes the challenge." 
Mr. Justice Washington of the United States explained 
the policy underlying the presumption of constitutionality 
Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 at 1037 (Utah 
1975) . 
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3 in Ogden v. Saunders, he stated: 
"It is but a decent respect due the wisdom, 
the integrity, and the patriotism of the 
legislative body by which any law is passed 
to presume in favor of its validity until its 
violation of the Constitution is proved 
beyond all reasonable doubt." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Municipal ordinances, like State statutes, are 
presumptively valid and the courts will indulge in every 
reasonable construction to render such a legislative act 
4 
valid and constitutional. 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND SUPREME COURT 
DECISION ALLOW GREATER REGULATION OF ALCOHOL 
BY STATE GOVERNMENTS. 
The presumption of constitutionality is especially 
strong in alcohol related matters. Justice Renquist wrote 
5 
in California v. LaRue, (upholding the right to regulate 
dancers and entertainment at bars in the face of First 
Amendment - free speech challenge): 
"Given the added presumption in favor of the 
validity of the state regulation in this 
area, that the Twenty-first Amendment 
requires, we cannot hold that the regulations 
3
 12 Wheaton 213, 6 L.Ed. 606 at p. 625 of L.Ed. (1827). 
4 
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 19.05-.06 at 
375 (3d ed. rev.); Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 
1037, (Utah 1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 915, 47 L.Ed.2d 
766; State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); Baker v. 
Matheson, 607 P. 223 (Utah 1979); Chandler v. Department of 
Employment Security, 678 P.2d 315 (Utah 1984). 
5
 409 U.S. 109, 34 L.Ed. 342, 98 S.Ct. 390 (1972). 
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on their face violate the federal 
Constitution." at p. 352. (Emphasis added.) 
The appellant-Andersons cite the case of Craig v. 
Boren without noting that the holding was based upon a 
suspect classification of sex. Boren held the drinking age 
in Oklahoma for men (age 21) could not be greater than that 
of women (18) . 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held 
the Twenty-first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
specifically gives States the power to regulate alcohol. 
The Boren case affirmed the principles enunciated in 
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp. which held that 
constitutional amendments must be considered in light of 
each other. 
As the amendments are considered in light of each other 
it becomes very clear the Supreme Court allows the state to 
impose restrictions on activities that may normally be 
protected by the first ten amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution on places that sell alcohol. In the case of 
g 
California v. LaRue, supra, the U.S.Supreme Court upheld 
restrictions on entertainment in bars and nightclubs even 
though some of the banned entertainment was normally 
429 U.S. 190, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976). 
7
 377 U.S. 322 (1964). 
8
 409 U.S. 109. 
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protected free speech under the First Amendment. The Court 
"The state regulations here challenged come 
to us, not in context of censoring a dramatic 
performance in a theatre, but rather in a 
context of licensing bars and nightclubs to 
sell liquor by the drink." 
"In Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 
41, 16 L.Ed.2d 336, 865 at 1254 (1966), this 
court said: 
"Consideration of any state law regulating 
intoxicating beverages must begin with the 
Twenty-first Amendment, the second section of 
which provides that: !the transportation or 
importation into any state territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery 
or use therein of intoxicating liquors in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.f 
"The court further stated: 
"While the states, vested as they are with 
general police power, require no specific 
grant of authority in the Federal 
Constitution to legislate with respect to 
matters traditionally within the scope of 
police powers, the broad sweep of the Twenty-
first Amendment has been recognized on 
conferring something more than the normal 
health, welfare and morals. In Hostetter v. 
Idlewide Liquor Corp. 377 U.S. 324, 12 
L.Ed.2d 350, 84 S.Ct. 1293 (1964) the court 
reaffirmed by reason of the Twenty-first 
Amendment fa state is totally unconfined by 
traditional commerce clause limitations when 
it restricts the importation of intoxicants 
destined for use, distribution or consumption 
within its borders.1 Still earlier the Court 
stated in State Board v. Young's Market Co., 
229 U.S. 59, 81 L.Ed 38, 57 S.Ct. 77 (1936): 
fa classification recognized by the Twenty-
first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by 
the Fourteenth.1" pp. 349-350 of Law Ed. 
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Thus the regulation of establishments selling alcoholic 
beverages is in large measure left to the States. 
B. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS ALSO HELD THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CASES CLAIMING DENIAL 
OF EQUAL PROTECTION IS THE REASONABLE 
RELATION TEST. 
The Utah Supreme Court imposes the standard of 
reasonable relation in viewing challenges to ordinances 
based upon a denial of equal protection. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Where a legislative enactment creates no 
inherently suspect classification, touches 
upon no fundamental interest as recognized in 
the Constituion, it satisfies the exigencies 
of equal protection if the classifications 
made thereby has a reasonable basis in 
legitimate legislative objective." 
Further, in State v. Amicone the appellant-Anderson 
was complaining that a Utah law mandating jail time for a 
misdemeanor was a denial of equal protection as no other 
misdemeanor required mandatory jail time. The Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
"The defendant does not demonstrate why a 
strict scrutiny standard, rather than a 
rational basis standard should be applied in 
determining the constitutionality of the 
classification . . . In our view, the 
rational basis test is the appropriate test 
to apply. The classification made by the 
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1981) (upholding ban on opposite sex massages). 
10
 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). 
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statute in this case is not founded on a 
suspect class nor does it impinge upon a 
fundamental liberty as that term has been 
used in equal protection cases. The statute 
in question bears a reasonable and 
substantial relation to a legitimate state 
objective." p. 1343. 
Given the fact both the Utah State Supreme Court and 
the United States Supreme Court require a presumption of 
validity to State laws when facing a constitutional 
challenge it is clear the ordinances must survive if the 
appellant-Andersons cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the ordinance is invalid. 
POINT II 
CITY HAS POWER TO MAKE REASONABLE CLASSIFICA-
TIONS. 
It is axiomatic that governments may make reasonable 
classifications. The United States Supreme Court has 
stated: 
"No question is or could be made by the 
corporation as to the right of a State, or a 
municipality with properly delegated power, 
to enact laws or ordinances based upon 
reasonable classification of the objects of 
the legislation or the persons whom it 
affects. fEqual protection1 does not 
prohibit this. Although the wide discretion 
as to classification retained by a legisla-
ture, often results in narrow distinctions. 
These distinctions, if reasonably related to 
the object of the legislation, are sufficient 
to justify the classification." New York 
Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 
573; 82 L.Ed. 1024 (1937) . 
In 1958 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle 
of classification stating: 
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"If the selection or classification is 
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests 
upon some reasonable consideration of 
difference or policy, there is no denial of 
equal protection of the law. [citations 
deleted] That a statute may discriminate in 
favor of a certain class does not render it 
arbitrary if the distinction is founded upon 
a reasonable distinction or difference in 
State policy." 
The law of reasonable classification has been adopted 
into Utah law. 
12 In State v. Taylor, the defendant was convicted of 
operating a business without a license. He claimed the 
classification denied him equal protection in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The 
Supreme Court explained that inequality may exist among 
members of different classes. All that is required, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment is equality of treatment among 
members of each class. 
As the Court said: 
"The state is not required to resort to close 
distinction or to maintain precise, 
scientific uniformity with reference to 
composition, use, or value. A state must 
proceed upon a rational basis, and may not 
resort to a classification which is palpably 
arbitrary. However, the state may discrimin-
ate in favor of a certain class, if the 
discrimination is founded upon a reasonable 
distinction or difference in State policy." 
at p. 1126. 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-528 3 
L.Ed.2d 480, 485, 79 S.Ct. 437 (1959). 
1 2
 541 P.2d 1124 (1975). 
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In this case State law forbids persons under age 21 to 
buy or consume alcoholic beverages. It also forbids persons 
under age 21 from owning or receiving any license authorized 
under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 
Salt Lake City is promoting the purpose of the State 
law by making it unlawful for any person to be in a Class 
"C" tavern. These taverns are licensed to sell draft or 
packaged beer for consumption on the premises. As shown in 
Point III infra, they are different in character, business 
make up, and atmosphere from any other alcohoLic beverage 
licensee. As such they consist of a separate legitimate 
classification. 
POINT III 
THE PROHIBITIONS ON MINORS IN CLASS "C" 
LICENSED TAVERNS IS A VALID PROHIBITION BASED 
UPON A VALID CLASSIFICATION. 
Salt Lake City has a variety of classes of licenses for 
alcoholic beverages. See Appendix A. Within each of these 
classifications are separate and distinct privileges and 
duties. We note the State of Utah has also adopted various 
classes of licenses with its attendant privileges and duties 
in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 
The State Alcoholic Beverage Control Act Section 32A-1-
1 et seq. sets up as different classes State liquor stores, 
package agencies, restaurant liquor licenses, private clubs, 
special use permits and special event permits. Each has 
different restrictions and privileges. Each has a different 
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number of maximum licenses allowed. Each has a different 
manner in which local governing bodies are involved in the 
decision process. Each has different operational 
restrictions applicable to its type of license. 
Each is clearly a separate class of license with a 
different sales operation and clientele. For example, 
restaurant liquor licensees cannot close more than 72 hours 
without giving prior notice to the Liquor Commission and 
they must derive at least 70% of its total restaurant 
business from food. 
Private club liquor licenses must obtain written 
consent of the local authorities while restaurants do not. 
Private clubs must have a place where meals are served in 
connection with indoor dining accommodations (32A-5-5 
U.C.A.). Private clubs must have membership records, fees 
and monthly dues. No officer or managing agent, employee or 
other person is to derive "a principal economic benefit from 
the operation of the club." (32A-5-7(22) U.C.A.). 
The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act also recognized that 
retail licenses for "light beer" are unique and thus local 
governments have power to regulate these items. It appears 
the differences are so unique that the Court can take 
judicial notice of the differences. A short and incomplete 
list of some differences includes: (1) no tavern or Class 
"C" license is required to serve food; (2) no percentage of 
the sales must be food; (3) no restriction is made as to 
-13-
profits and to whom they are to be paid; (4) the principal 
business of a Class MC" tavern is to sell draft or packaged 
beer for consumption on the premises. 
In all license classifications the prohibitions on 
minors being sold or served alcohol are imposed, but it is 
clearly more of a problem to regulate that prohibition in 
Class "C" tavern whose main purpose is to make money selling 
as much beer as possible to people on the premises than it 
is private clubs or restaurants. The restriction 
prohibiting minors in a tavern (Class MC" license) is a 
valid regulation. It promotes the legitimate State concern 
which prohibits the sale to or consumption of alcohol to 
persons under age 21. 
In a case directly in point, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled the manager of a Class "C" licensed bar lounge could 
be held strictly liable for allowing a 19 year old 
participant in a fashion show to be on the premises in 
violation of Section 19-3-9 R.O.S.L.C., Salt Lake City v. 
Ronnenburg, 674 P.2d 128 (1983). 
The Court briefly addressed the question of equal 
protection and due process as it addressed the 
reasonableness of the absolute liability provision. 
In Ronnenberg the Court held: 
"We do not find the ordinance prohibiting the 
presence of minors on the premises that sell 
beer to be arbitrary. The prohibited 
activity has a direct relation to the 
public's interest in regulating alcohol and 
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protecting minors. The ordinance is designed 
to protect this public interest in similar 
fashion to the authorization given cities to 
prohibit the sale of beer in theatres, at 
dances or close to schools. (citations 
deleted) Furthermore, the sweep of the 
ordinance is not too broad. It applies only 
to persons operating or employed in an 
establishment for the sale of beer. Such 
affected persons have the opportunity to 
avoid the consequences of the law." 
(Emphasis added) at p. 129. 
The Utah Supreme Court has thus authoritatively ruled 
the requirement of Section 19-3-9 R.O.S.L.C. is a reasonable 
regulation which does not impact unequally on people. 
Clearly Section 19-3-8 which is the corollary to Section 19-
3-8 is also a reasonable regulation which provides equal 
protection. 
The fact appellant-Anderson Jode Anderson is the wife 
of James Anderson is no import as we note State law 
specifically prohibits ownership of an alcohol licensed 
business in any classification by a minor (as defined in the 
Liquor Control Act a minor is a person under age 21. 32A-1-
5(21)). The prohibition of persons under age 21 from a 
Class "CM licensed tavern promotes the state interest of not 
allowing persons under age 21 to drink alcoholic beverages. 
It removes them from a business whose main purpose - if not 
sole purpose - is to sell beer. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDINANCES HAVE A PLAIN MEANING AND THIS 
COURT NEED NOT CONSTRUE CITY ORDINANCE AS 
PLAINTIFF REQUESTS. 
-15-
The appellant-Andersons' throwaway argument in Point 
III of their Brief that this Court should judicially rewrite 
the Salt Lake City ordinances to comply with the appellant-
Andersons1 self-serving interests is an insult to the 
American system of government. This obvious bad faith 
argument is more deserving of Rule 11 sanctions than a 
serious response. 
The "construction" which the appellant-Andersons would 
have the Court place on the ordinances would be clearly 
contrary to the unambiguous legislative intent and the plain 
meaning of the ordinance. As the Utah Supreme Court held in 
In re Stevens1 Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P.2d 85 (1942): 
"The language of the statute is plain and its 
meaning is clear, in which case there is no 
occasion to search for its meaning beyond the 
statute itself." (Extensive citations 
omitted.) 
See also Sutherland Statutory Construction, Section 45.02 
(4th Ed.); 75 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 194. 
The appellants1 mis-citation of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 
33, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915) is evidence of the bad faith nature 
of this entire appeal. Truax is totally irrelevant to this 
case and deals solely with illegal employment discrimination 
against aliens. Truax, supra at 43, does note, however, 
that: 
[T]he legislature may recognize degrees of 
evil and adapt its legislation accordingly. 
. . . (citations omitted). 
As shown in Point I-III above the City ordinances make a 
rationally supportable distinction. 
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In this case the appellant-Andersons presented no proof 
of the ordinance's invalidity at the trial nor in their 
brief before this Court, 
CONCLUSION 
The ordinances in question, 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 
R,O.S.L.C. are constitutional. Class "C" licensed taverns 
constitute a valid classification of licenses* The 
privileges and restrictions placed upon holdings of Class 
"C" licenses promote a valid state purpose. Those 
challenged ordinances are entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality under both State and federal law. As 
these ordinances deal with alcoholic beverages the City need 
only show a rational basis for the restriction. Appellant-
Andersons have the burden of proving the acts 
unconstitutional and have failed to produce any evidence 
which shows denial of equal protection. This Court should 
uphold the ordinances as being constitutional under both the 
State and United States Constitutions. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
GREG R. HAWKINS 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
GRHrcc 
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Sec. 19-1-10. Wholesaler. "Wholesaler" means any person other than a 
brewer or retailer engaged in importation for sale or in the sale of beer in 
wholesale or jobbing quantities. 
Sec. 19-1-11. Restaurant. "Restaurant" as used in connection with the 
issuance of Class ltBM retail license shall mean premises where a variety of 
hot food is prepared and served for consumption on the premises. 
Bill No 95 June 10 1976 
Bill No 151 1977 
Chapter 2 
BEER LICENSES 
Sections: 
19-2-1. License to sell beer at wholesale. 
19-2-2. License to sell beer at retail. 
19-2-3. Retail licenses classified. 
19-2-4. Class "A" license. 
19-2-5. Class "B" license. 
19-2-6. Class UC" license. 
19-2-7. Class "D" license. 
19-2-8. Class UE" license. 
19-2-9. Seasonal license. 
19-2-10. Club license. Repealed. 
19-2-11. Application for license. General requirements. 
19-2-12. Id. Referral to chief of police. 
19-2-13. Id. Referral to health department. 
19-2-14. Id. Filing date for holders of old licenses and forfeiture of 
renewal rights. 
19-2-15. Restrictions on number of class UC" licenses. Repealed. 
19-2-16. Transfer of license to new location. 
19-2-17. Forfeiture of license. 
19-2-18. License fees. 
19-2-19. Location limitation of certain licenses. 
19-2 20. Expiration of license. 
19-2-21. Suspension and revocation of licenses. 
19-2-22. Sub-lease, transfer or assignment of license prohibited. 
Mav 1974 
Dec 1975 
October 1976 
April, 1978 
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19-2-23. Operation to be in conformance with law. 
19-2-24. Name change. 
19-2-25. Increased costs. 
Sec. 19-2-1. License to sell beer at wholesale. It shall be unlawful for any 
person to engage in the business of selling beer at wholesale within the 
limits of Salt Lake City without first obtaining a license therefor from the li-
quor control commission of Utah and paying a fee therefor in the sum of two 
hundred dollars per annum. 
Sec. 19-2-2. License to sell beer at retail. It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to engage in the business of the sale of beer at retail, in bottles, cans or 
draft, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City without first having pro-
cured a license therefor from the Board of Commissioners of said city as 
hereinafter provided. A separate license shall be required for each place of 
sale and the license itself shall identify the specific premises covered 
thereby and said license shall at all times be conspicuously displayed in the 
place to which it shall refer or for which it shall be issued. All licensees shall 
comply with the provisions of the liquor control act of Utah and the regula-
tions of the liquor control commission and this chapter, and every license 
shall recite that it is granted subject to revocation as is provided in section 
19-2-21 of this chaDter. . 32-4-17, U.CA. 1953. 
Sec. 19-2-3. Retail licenses classified. Retail licenses issued under the 
provisons of this chapter shall be classified into the following types which 
shall carry the privileges and responsibilities hereinafter set forth in this 
chapter: 
Class "A" Class "C" Class " E " 
Class " B " Class " D " Seasonal Club
 No. 157i 
3 Jan. 80 
Sec. 19-2-4. Class "A" license. A class "A" retail license shall entitle the 
licensee to sell beer on the premises described in said license in original con-
tainers for consumption off the premises in accordance with the Liquor Con-
trol Act of Utah and these revised~city ordinances; provided, however, that 
it shall be unlawful for the licensee to sell or distribute beer in any container 
larger than a half gallon. NO. 34,1974 
Sec. 19-2-5. Class " B " license, (a) A class l 4B" retail license shall entitle 
the licensee to sell beer in the original containers on the premises. 
(b) Only bona fide restaurants, where a variety of hot food is 
prepared and cooked and complete meals are served to the general public in 
May, 1974 October. 1976 
Dec, 1975 April, 1978 
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connection with mdoor dining accommodations, and which food sales 
constitute at least 600/o of the gross dollar values of licensee's business shall 
be entitled to class UB" licenses. 
(c) The holders of class "B" licenses shall maintain records which shall 
disclose the gross sale of beer and the gross sales of food served for 
consumption on the licensed premises during each and every month of the 
year. In those licensed premises which are also licensed to allow 
consumption of liquor on the premises m accordance with chapter 4 of this 
title, the sales of carbonated and noncarbonated soft drinks, soda water, 
water, and other mixers shall not constitute the sales of food within the 
meaning of this ordinance and such licensee shall maintain a separate record 
which shall disclose the gross sales of such drinks during eacn and every 
month of the year. The foregomg sales shall be shown separately in said 
records and each licensee shall retain all mvoices, vouchers, sales slips, 
receipts, and other records of purchases of beer, soft drmks, and food from 
his suppliers. Such records and supporting data shall be available for 
inspection and audit by the city license assessor and collector or the city 
auditor at any time following the end of each month and for eighteen months 
thereafter. 
Failure of a licensee to properly maintain or submit said records for 
inspection and audit shall be cause for suspension or revocation of his 
class "B" license. 
(d) If any audit or inspection discloses that the sales of food served for 
consumption on any licensed premises hereunder are less than sixty percent 
of the gross dollar volume of business for any month, the class "B" license of 
such licensee may be suspended by the board of city commissioners, after 
the licensee has been afforded notice and a hearing regarding said license, 
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person under the age of twenty-one 
years to sell or serve beer or liquor under this license. 
(f) It shall be unlawful for any licensee, operator, manager or any 
other person in charge of a restaurant holding a class "B" retail license to: 
(1) Sell food for consumption on the premises in an amount which 
constitutes less than 60% of the restaurant's gross dollar volume of business 
during any monthly period; or 
(2) Sell beer or liquor if said establishment is licensed for such, other 
than m conjunction with the purchase of food menu items; or 
(3) Advertise the sale of beer or liquor other than within the menu or 
by word of mouth; or 
(4) Hire or allow or permit any person under twenty-one years of age 
to serve beer or liquor for consumption on the premises. 
Bill No 151 1977 
October 1976 
ADHI 1978 
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If any audit or inspection discloses that the sales of food served for 
consumption on any licensed premises hereunder are less than sixty percent 
of the gross dollar volume of business for any month, the class UB" license of 
such licensee shall immediately be suspended and shall not be reinstated until 
the licensee is able to prove to the satisfaction of the board of commissioners 
that in the future the sales of food served for consumption on the licensed 
premises will exceed sixty percent of the gross dollar volume of business. 
No person under the age of twenty-one years shall sell or serve beer 
under this license. 
It shall be unlawful for any licensee, operator, or manager, or any other 
person in charge of a business holding a class UB" retail license to hire or allow 
or permit any person under twenty-one years of age to serve beer for 
consumption on the premises.
 Feb 1970 
Bill No. 97, Aug. 28^  1975 
Sec. 19-2-6. Class "C" license. A class "C" retail license shall entitle 
the licensee to sell beer on draft for consumption on or off the premises 
and to all the privileges granted the holders of class "A" and " B " retail 
licenses in accordance with the liquor control act of Utah. 
Sec. 19-2-7. Class "D" license. A class "D" retail license shall entitle 
the licensee to sell packaged beer for consumption on the licensed premises 
and shall entitle the holder thereof to all the privileges granted the holders 
of class "A" and " B " retail licenses in accordance with the liquor control 
act of Utah. A class "D" license shall be required for all premises where 
the primary or main business is that of selling packaged beer for con-
sumption on the licensed premises. Class " D " licenses shall be issued and 
renewed only to the present licensed establishments and shall be eliminated 
upon the termination of business of the present class "D" establishments. 
Sec. 19-2-8. Class "E" license. No beer may be sold or dispensed to 
the public on or within any publicly-owned recreation facility by any person, 
corporation or organization except by the holder of a class " E " retail 
license for such premises. A class "E'" retail license shall entitle the li-
censee to sell beer for consumption on publicly-owned recreation facilities; 
provided, however, that no such class " E " license shall be issued unless 
such prospective licensee shall first obtain a concession contract from the 
public body owning the recreation facility involved. Under this class " E " 
license, no beer may be sold in the original containers, but must first be 
emptied into suitable temporary containers; and no person under the age 
of twenty-one years of age may sell or serve beer. All sales and deliveries 
under this license shall be made directly to the consumer.B,u NO-61*Jun0 2 9 « 1971 
Sec. 19-2-9. Seasonal license. A seasonal license shall carry the privileges 
of a class "C" retail license and shall be for a period of less than one y^ai 
to be determined by the board of commissioners. 
Jan. 1975 
Dec. 1975 
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